Publications

Prediction-sharing During Training and Inference

with Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz 

Appeared in the Seventeenth International Symphosium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT-24)


Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms

with Aviv Yaish

Appeared in the Twenty-Fifth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-24)


Discrete and Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms

with Aviv Yaish

Appeared in the Fifth International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE-24)


Unified Fair Allocation for Indivisible Goods and Chores via Copies

with Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Published in Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC). 


Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions

with Moshe Tennenholtz

Appeared in the Nineteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-23). (Arxiv)


From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail

with Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling

Appeared in the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-23). (Arxiv)


Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks

with Moshe Tennenholtz

Appeared in the Twenty-Third ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC-22). (Arxiv)


Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation

with Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR). Appeared in the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21). (Arxiv)


VCG under False-name (Sybil) Attacks --- a Bayesian Analysis

with Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz

Appeared in the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-20). (Arxiv)


Working papers

Competitive Revenue Extraction from Time-discounted Transactions in the Semi-myopic Range

with Aviv Yaish


Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting 

with Ben Golan


Envy-free Explore and Exploit (draft can be shared upon request)

with Omer Ben-Porat, Or Markovetzki


Incentive-Compatible Collusion Resistance via Posted Prices (draft can be shared upon request)

with Matheus V.X. Ferreira, Max Resnick